Franske myndigheder skal forlade nye muslimske områder
Derfor brænder Paris
Hvordan man laver en islamisk revolution i et ikke-islamisk samfund.
"En vantro regering må ikke have frie hænder. Vi skal skabe den rette atmosfære, hvor vi kan opdrage en genraation, som vil rive de falske guders troner ned og tilintetgøre de vantro regeringers ulovlige magt. Vi har ikke noget alternativ end at arbejde på at ødelægge de fordærvede systemer. Dette er en pligt, som er betroet alle muslimer, hvor de end opholder sig - pligten at skabe en triumferende revolution for islam Vi må uophørligt propagandere, afsløre den uærlighed og forbryderiske planer, som findes hos alle vantro myndigheder. Hele den store islamiske masse bliver på denne måde gradvist sat op imod de vantro, og da er vort mål nået". Ayatollah Khomeini: "Islamisk styre". Bogen om, hvordan man laver en islamisk revolution i et vantro(dvs ikke-islamisk) samfund.
Skrevet af Amir Taheri
(tidligere chefredaktør ved Teherans største avis i Iran indtil oprettelsen af islamisk styre gennem Khomeini ). "Opstanden mod de franske myndigheder begyndte i Parisforstaden Clichy, hvor fransk politi og offentlige myndigheder havde holdt sig borte i årevis og hvor ca 80% er muslimer, som er indvandret fortinsvis fra Algeriet i 80erne og 90erne. Ikke kun de franske myndigheder holder sig borte, det drejer sig også om alt lige fra taxaer til avisbude, postbude, lægekørsel, etc. For at markere sin eksistens rykkede fransk politi ind i forstaden i forbindelse med et biltyvrei. Denne polititilstedeværelse blev anset som en provokation, hvorfor politiet blev angrebet med stor voldsomhed og flugtagtigt måtte forlade Clichy under stenkast og råbet "Allah er stor". Under de senere uroligheder, hvor både politi og brandvæsen massivt rykkede ind i bydelen, anså unge muslimer dette for en krigserklæring og som et forsøg på at tilbageerobre et "Frit islamask område". Forstaden er allerede delvist organiseret som et islamisk område efter det islamiske milletsystem og med islamisk lov styret af lokale islamiske sheiker. I nogle områder er der pligt til at kvinder bærer hijab(tørklæde). Milletsystemet stammer fra det islamiske khalifat og var er et system, som går ud fra, at islam kan etablere sig og sin lovgivning autonomt uden indblanding fra vantro(dvs ikke-islamiske) myndigheder.
Opstanden har siden sin begyndelse i slutningen af Okt. 2005 bredt sig til mere end 160 franske byer i midten af nov. samt til flere indvandrerområder i større byer i Belgien og det sydlige Tyskland.
WHY PARIS IS BURNING
by Amir Taheri, November 4, 2005
AS THE night falls, the "troubles" start - and the pattern is always
the same.
Bands of youths in balaclavas start by setting fire to parked cars,
break shop windows with baseball bats, wreck public telephones and ransack
cinemas, libraries and schools. When the police arrive on the scene, the
rioters attack them with stones, knives and baseball bats.
The police respond by firing tear-gas grenades and, on occasions,
blank shots in the air. Sometimes the youths fire back - with real bullets.
These scenes are not from the West Bank but from 20 French cities,
mostly close to Paris, that have been plunged into a European version of the
intifada that at the time of writing appears beyond control.
The troubles first began in Clichy-sous-Bois.
By Monday, everyone in Paris was speaking of "an unprecedented
crisis." Both Sarkozy and his boss, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin,
had to cancel foreign trips to deal with the riots.
How did it all start? The accepted account is that sometime last
week, a group of young boys in Clichy engaged in one of their favorite
sports: stealing parts of parked cars.
Normally, nothing dramatic would have happened, as the police have
not been present in that suburb for years.
The problem came when one of the inhabitants telephoned the police and reported the thieving spree taking place just
opposite her building. The police were thus obliged to do something - which
meant entering a city that, as noted, had been a no-go area for them.
Once the police arrived on the scene, the youths - who had been
reigning over Clichy pretty unmolested for years - got really angry. A brief
chase took place in the street, and two of the youths, who were not actually
chased by the police, sought refuge in a cordoned-off area housing a power
pylon. Both were electrocuted.
Once news of their deaths was out, Clichy was all up in arms.
With cries of "God is great," bands of youths armed with whatever
they could get hold of went on a rampage and forced the police to flee.
The French authorities could not allow a band of youths to expel the
police from French territory. So they hit back - sending in Special Forces,
known as the CRS, with armored cars and tough rules of engagement.
Within hours, the original cause of the incidents was forgotten and
the issue jelled around a demand by the representatives of the rioters that
the French police leave the "occupied territories." By midweek, the riots
had spread to three of the provinces neighboring Paris, with a population of
5.5 million.
But who lives in the affected areas? In Clichy itself, more than 80
percent of the inhabitants are Muslim immigrants or their children, mostly
from Arab and black Africa. In other affected towns, the Muslim immigrant
community accounts for 30 percent to 60 percent of the population. But these
are not the only figures that matter. Average unemployment in the affected
areas is estimated at around 30 percent and, when it comes to young would-be
workers, reaches 60 percent.
In these suburban towns, built in the 1950s in imitation of the
Soviet social housing of the Stalinist era, people live in crammed
conditions, sometimes several generations in a tiny apartment, and see "real
French life" only on television.
The French used to flatter themselves for the success of their
policy of assimilation, which was supposed to turn immigrants from any
background into "proper Frenchmen" within a generation at most.
That policy worked as long as immigrants came to France in drips and
drops and thus could merge into a much larger mainstream. Assimilation,
however, cannot work when in most schools in the affected areas, fewer than
20 percent of the pupils are native French speakers.
France has also lost another powerful mechanism for assimilation:
the obligatory military service abolished in the 1990s.
As the number of immigrants and their descendants increases in a
particular locality, more and more of its native French inhabitants leave
for "calmer places," thus making assimilation still more difficult.
In some areas, it is possible for an immigrant or his descendants to
spend a whole life without ever encountering the need to speak French, let
alone familiarize himself with any aspect of the famous French culture.
The result is often alienation. And that, in turn, gives radical
Islamists an opportunity to propagate their message of religious and
cultural apartheid.
Some are even calling for the areas where Muslims form a majority of
the population to be reorganized on the basis of the "millet" system of the
Ottoman Empire: Each religious community (millet) would enjoy the right to
organize its social, cultural and educational life in accordance with its
religious beliefs.
In parts of France, a de facto millet system is already in place. In
these areas, all women are obliged to wear the standardized Islamist "hijab"
while most men grow their beards to the length prescribed by the sheiks.
The radicals have managed to chase away French shopkeepers selling
alcohol and pork products, forced "places of sin," such as dancing halls,
cinemas and theaters, to close down, and seized control of much of the local
administration.
A reporter who spent last weekend in Clichy and its neighboring
towns of Bondy, Aulnay-sous-Bois and Bobigny heard a single overarching
message: The French authorities should keep out.
"All we demand is to be left alone," said Mouloud Dahmani, one of
the local "emirs" engaged in negotiations to persuade the French to withdraw
the police and allow a committee of sheiks, mostly from the Muslim
Brotherhood, to negotiate an end to the hostilities.
President Jacques Chirac and Premier de Villepin are especially sore
because they had believed that their opposition to the toppling of Saddam
Hussein in 2003 would give France a heroic image in the Muslim community.
That illusion has now been shattered - and the Chirac
administration, already passing through a deepening political crisis,
appears to be clueless about how to cope with what the Parisian daily France
Soir has called a "ticking time bomb."
It is now clear that a good portion of France's Muslims not only
refuse to assimilate into "the superior French culture," but firmly believe
that Islam offers the highest forms of life to which all mankind should
aspire.
So what is the solution? One solution, offered by Gilles Kepel, an
adviser to Chirac on Islamic affairs, is the creation of "a new Andalusia"
in which Christians and Muslims would live side by side and cooperate to
create a new cultural synthesis.
The problem with Kepel's vision, however, is that it does not
address the important issue of political power. Who will rule this new
Andalusia: Muslims or the largely secularist Frenchmen?
Suddenly, French politics has become worth watching again, even
though for the wrong reasons.
Amir Taheri, editor of the French quarterly "Politique
internationale," is a member of Benador Associates.
